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HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: "CONSPICUOUS TYPE"
STANDARDS IN MANDATED COMMUNICATION
STATUTES
Mary Beth Beazley*
When people talk to each other, they often say, "I see" when they want to say
that they understand. But seeing is not really the same thing as understanding. If
you have ever signed one of those contracts that has an "all caps"' paragraph, you
probably saw the paragraph before you signed the contract, but that did not mean
that you understood it, or even that you had read it.2 Here is a typical disclaimer
paragraph from a business contract:
Warranty. All shipments of the product sold hereby are subject to the
following warranty: THE SELLER WARRANTS FOR A PERIOD OF
ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF DELIVERY THAT THE
PRODUCT IS FREE FROM DEFECTS IN MATERIALS AND
WORKMANSHIP. THIS LIMITED WARRANTY IS YOUR
EXCLUSIVE WARRANTY FROM THE SELLER AND DESCRIBES
THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY AVAILABLE TO ANY PURCHASER
OF THE PRODUCT. THE PRODUCT IS NOT SOLD WITH ANY
IMPLIED WARRANTIES. NOR ANY WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND/OR OTHER WARRANTY OF FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN THE SALE OF THE PRODUCT
SELLER MAKES NO REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF
ANY KIND OTHER THAN THAT STATED HEREIN AND NO
PERSON IS AUTHORIZED TO ALTER THIS WARRANTY
ORALLY.3
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law. The author thanks
Dean Alan Michaels and the Moritz College of Law for generous research support. She also thanks Monte
Smith, for reasons too numerous to count; Dan Tokaji and L. Camille H6bert, for thoughtful reviews and
guidance; Nathan Geary, for research assistance; Matthew Cooper, of the Moritz Law Library, for finding
things I didn't even know were out there; and Susan Edwards and Allyson Hennelly, for superb administrative
support.
1. This article will use the term "all caps" to refer to text printed in all capital letters. Courts and
statutes also refer to "Capitals," "Capital letters," and "Upper case" or "Uppercase" to mean the same thing.
2. E.g., Erica A. Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 169, 171 (2012) ("As a practical
matter, no one reads all warnings in uppercase type . . . .").
3. This language comes from a contract at issue in Omni USA, Inc. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 798 F.
Supp. 2d 831 (S.D. Tex. 2011). The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff s
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You could probably see that paragraph on a page, and you might even be able
to find it in a three or four page document if you were looking for it. But seeing a
chunk of text is not the same thing as reading it, and reading it is not the same thing
as understanding it. And if you skipped that paragraph, you are not alone. Many
readers would find that paragraph so dense and unattractive that they would skip it,
or would have a hard time understanding the meaning even if they did read it. All-
caps paragraphs are visually difficult to read,4 and in many documents, the
paragraphs that are in all caps are also written in a style that slows reader
comprehension.
I understand why sellers put paragraphs like that into contracts. The UCC and
its state counterparts enforce an implied warranty of merchantability unless the
contract disclaims the warranty.5 So sellers write disclaimers. Of course, they have
no reason to write and present them in a way that is easy to understand, and every
reason to write and present them in a way that discourages readers from looking
closely at them. They are trying to increase profit and limit potential liability in
every way they can. Sellers do not write disclaimers because they want buyers to
know things. They write them so they can say to the buyer, "I told you so. I told
you that you can't sue me for violating the warranty of merchantability. So even
though that paragraph was hard to read, and hard to understand if you did read it,
it's your fault that you didn't know that you didn't have that warranty." 6
But this article is not about the clauses that sellers write. It's about the clauses
that legislatures write, when they enact statutes that mandate the inclusion of
particular language, presented in a particular way, and aimed at a particular
audience. There are dozens of state statutes (and many federal ones) that contain
specific words that must appear in certain kinds of documents. I call this language
mandated communication, and I call the statutes that include these mandates
mandated communication statutes.
When statutes mandate categories of information (rather than specific words)
that lenders or sellers must include in a document, it makes sense that the lenders or
sellers would write that language in a way that may not promote speedy
comprehension. But that result doesn't make sense when the legislature is actually
writing the language, when it has an explicit or implicit goal of getting particular
information to someone, or of making sure that both sides in a transaction have
claims for breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranty of merchantability, finding that the
warranty exclusions were conspicuous, and Omni was aware of them. Id.
4. E.g., Ruth Anne Robbins, Painting with Print: Incorporating Concepts of Typographic and Layout
Design into the Text ofLegal Writing Documents, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 116 (2004)
(hypothesizing that readers skip paragraphs in all caps); OFFICE OF INv. EDUC. & ASSISTANCE, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: How TO CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 43
(1998) [hereinafter SEC DISCLOSURE] (Sentences written in all caps "usually bring the reader to a standstill
because the shapes of the words disappear, causing the reader to slow down and study each letter. Ironically,
readers tend to skip sentences written in [all caps.]")
5. U.C.C., § 2-314.
6. Zacks, supra note 2, at 169 (arguing that mandatory disclosures and other supposedly pro-
consumer contracting strategies hurt those without bargaining power because they "reinforce our tendency to
perceive the contracting party as being able to act freely without being influenced by his or her situation").
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certain information. If this goal is so important that the legislature has concluded
that it must dictate the specific words that will be said, and the way they must be
presented, it is not rational to write that language in a way that's hard for writers to
read and understand.
I have posted below two sample excerpts from a fictional child support order.
One of them is taken almost verbatim from a mandated communication statute.7
Please read them; I will have some questions for you when you are done.
Sample A:
EACH PARTY TO THIS SUPPORT ORDER MUST NOTIFY THE
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IN WRITING OF HIS
OR HER CURRENT MAILING ADDRESS, CURRENT RESIDENCE
ADDRESS, CURRENT RESIDENCE TELEPHONE NUMBER,
CURRENT DRIVER'S LICENSE NUMBER, AND OF ANY
CHANGES IN THAT INFORMATION. EACH PARTY MUST
NOTIFY THE AGENCY OF ALL CHANGES UNTIL FURTHER
NOTICE FROM THE COURT OR AGENCY, WHICHEVER ISSUED
THE SUPPORT ORDER. IF YOU ARE THE OBLIGOR UNDER A
CHILD SUPPORT ORDER AND YOU FAIL TO MAKE THE
REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS, YOU MAY BE FINED UP TO $50
FOR A FIRST OFFENSE, $100 FOR A SECOND OFFENSE, AND
$500 FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE. IF YOU ARE AN
OBLIGOR OR OBLIGEE UNDER ANY SUPPORT ORDER ISSUED
BY A COURT AND YOU WILLFULLY FAIL TO GIVE THE
REQUIRED NOTICES, YOU MAY BE FOUND IN CONTEMPT OF
COURT AND BE SUBJECTED TO FINES UP TO $1,000 AND
IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORE THAN 90 DAYS.
Sample B:
This section describes how you have to provide contact information
now and in the future. If you don't provide the information in the
right way and at the right times, you might have to pay fines or go to
jail.
A. What contact information am I required to provide to the child
support enforcement agency?
1. If you are a party to this support order, you must notify the child
7. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3121.29 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (mandating language
that must appear in child support orders).
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support enforcement agency in writing of the following four items of
information:
a. your current mailing address
b. your current residence address (if different from mailing address)
c. your current residence telephone number
d. your current driver's license number.
2. If any of this information changes after you have provided the
information to the Agency, you must notify the Agency of those changes.
B. How long do I have to continue to update this information?
You must provide this information until the Court or Agency that issued
the support order tells you that you may stop providing it. In general,
you can expect to have to provide the information for as long as the
support order is in effect.
C. What are the penalties if I fail to provide the information?
The penalties vary depending on whether you are an obligor (a person
who has to pay the support) or an obligee (a person who receives
support). They may also vary depending on whether you failed to
provide the information willfully (on purpose) or negligently (by mistake
or accident).
1. If you are the obligor under a child support order and you fail to
provide the required information and updates - even if the failure was not
on purpose - you may be fined up to $50 for a first offense, $100 for a
second offense, and $500 for each subsequent offense.
2. If you are either an obligor or obligee under any support order issued
by a court and you willfully fail to give the required notices, you may be
found in contempt of court and subjected to fines up to $1,000 and
imprisonment for not more than 90 days.
The information in this section is important; if you did not
understand any of the information, please ask the court to explain it.
Which of the two samples would you rather read? Which would you rather
keep to use as a reference for the duration of the court order? I am guessing that
you chose Sample B as the answer to both questions. Of course, since you were
forewarned that you would have to answer questions about the text, you probably
did read (or try to read) Sample A. It is readable (if you are willing to take the
4 [Vol. 40:1
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time), although it is not particularly easy to understand. But based on current
knowledge of common human reading behaviors, many, if not most, readers would
glance at Sample A, shudder, and skip it (or scroll past it). They would then scan
the headings of Sample B, reading beyond the headings of any particular section
based on need or interest.
Sample A is physically harder to read because it is written in all caps, which
tends to interfere with effective reading.8 But Sample A would still be hard to read
even if it were written in "mixed case" (i.e., not all caps). Sample A is not well-
organized, and its sentences are not written in a way that speeds reader
comprehension. 9 Conversely, Sample B used several techniques that are easy to
incorporate and known to speed comprehension: mixed-case text, with better white
space and alignment; personal pronouns; "chunking" of information; bold-faced
headings in FAQ style; concrete subjects and verbs; and definitions of unusual
terms.10
The Plain English movement, of course, advocates all of these techniques, and
has had an impact on government communication at many levels." There are both
state and federal statutes and regulations that articulate methods for clear and
effective communication. The Oregon Department of Human Services,12 the
federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,13 the Securities and Exchange
Commission,14 and various other governmental entities know how to require this
8. See, e.g., Miles A. Tinker, The Influence of Form of Type on the Perception of Words, 16 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL.167, 167 (1932) ("Most individuals prefer to read material printed in lower-case. The subjec-
tive reaction of annoyance in reading text in capitals or italics may be significant[,] for this material is read
appreciably slower than text printed in lower-case type.").
9. JOSEPH M. WILLIAMS & GREGORY COLOMB, STYLE: LESSONS IN CLARITY AND GRACE (10th ed.
2009).
10. See generally, J. B. Kitching, Patient Information Leaflets-The State of the Art, 83 J. ROYAL
SOC'Y MED., 298, 299 (1990); Jan H. Spyridakis & Michael J. Wenger, Writing for Human Performance:
Relating Reading Research to Document Design, _TECHNICAL COMM., 202, 211 (1992).
11. See generally JOSEPH KIMBLE, WRITING FOR DOLLARS, WRITING TO PLEASE: THE CASE FOR PLAIN
LANGUAGE IN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND LAw (2012) (debunking plain English myths and describing
summarizing case studies of plain language revisions); Joe Kimble, An Excerpt from Writing for Dollars,
Writing to Please, 91 MICH. B.J., 54 (2012) (describing case study of a revision of Washington state docu-
ments).
12. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.967 (West 2013) provides: "Every form, notice, brochure or other
written material of the Department of Human Services intended for use by persons inquiring about, applicants
for or recipients of public assistance shall be written in plain language. A form, notice, or brochure is written
in plain language if it substantially complies with all of the following tests: (1) Uses short sentences and para-
graphs; (2) Uses everyday words readable at an eighth-grade level of reading ability; (3) Uses simple and
active verb forms; (4) Uses type of readable size; (5) Uses uppercase and lowercase letters; (6) Heads sections
and other subdivisions with captions which fairly reflect the content of the section or subdivision and which
are in boldfaced type or otherwise stand out significantly from the text; (7) Uses layout and spacing which
separate the paragraphs and sections of the document from each other and from the borders of the paper; (8) Is
written and organized in a clear and coherent manner; (9) Is designed to facilitate ease of reading and com-
prehension; and (10) Is readable at the sixth-grade level of reading ability except for vocabulary referred to in
subsection (2) of this section."
13. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PLAIN WRITING ACT COMPLIANCE REPORT (2012), available
at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fl201204_reportjplain-writing-act-compliance.pdf (describing compliance
with the Plain Writing Act by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
14. See SEC DISCLOSURE, supra note 4, at 2.
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kind of writing in their documents. Too many states, however, haven't yet gotten
the memo.
This article has a simple premise: when a government mandates written
communication, it should present the mandated communication in a way that speeds
comprehension. When communication is so important that the government is
mandating the words and the presentation method, the writer and not the reader
should not bear the burden of making sure that the information is comprehensible.
In other words, the reader should not have to work to decipher the information; the
writer should work to make the information easy to comprehend.
A few different factors might explain this legislative failure. First, many
mandated communication statutes are statutes that regulate powerful corporate
interests. If lobbyists are holding sway, legislatures may be influenced to use
language that lobbyists suggest, without questioning whether that language would
fulfill the legislative goal. Even if this were true, however, it would not explain the
failure to use comprehensible language in the many statutes that regulate
governmental communication, such as that in the child support court order
illustrated in Sample A. There is no incentive, financial or otherwise, for
governments to communicate in this way; no one benefits when parties don't
understand court orders.
Some of the legislative failings may stem from the fact that many of these
statutes were first written in the typewriter era, when bold-faced type and other
effective techniques of emphasis were not available outside the print shop.15
Modem statutes may simply be written in imitation of similar statutes on the books.
Organization and sentence structure may be ineffective because legislatures are
unlikely to be aware of modem knowledge of reader behavior; they are more likely
to be focused on legislative needs than on reader needs. 16 Finally, legislatures may
have been influenced by statutes and court decisions that put the burden of
comprehension on the reader in a variety of legislative contexts. These court
decisions seem to believe in the existence of "rational economic readers," and to
punish those who do not fit into this mold. Too many of these writing and design
decisions focus on whether readers can see the relevant information, paying no
attention to whether they can read it or understand it.
Admittedly, there is controversy about whether mandated communication
statutes are the best way to communicate consumer information,17 or to protect
15. See Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson, Telling Through Type: Typography and Narrative in Legal Briefs,
7 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 87, 90 (2010) (citing JAMES FELICI, THE COMPLETE MANUAL OF TY-
POGRAPHY: A GUIDE TO SETTING PERFECT TYPE 80 (2003)).
16. Focusing on reader needs is a foundational tenet of legal writing theory. See J. Christopher Rideout
& Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: The View from Within, 61 MERCER L. REV. 705, 713 (2010) (discussing
how legal writers must consider the needs and expectations of the audience for their documents).
17. See, e.g., Zacks, supra note 2, at 169, 171-72 ("Behavioral research shows, for example, that con-
tract warnings or disclosures are largely ignored by contracting parties. The number of signature blocks in a
rental car contract similarly is irrelevant to the decisions made in the contracting context in which the renter
finds himself.")
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consumers.18 Some challenge the contractual behavior that the disclosures allow,
while others argue with the timing of the disclosures.' 9 One author argues
persuasively that obfuscating disclosures actually provide a benefit to consumers by
giving them one last argument against unconscionable corporate behavior.20
This article does not address the issue of whether mandatory disclosures should
continue to exist. It presumes, however, that in both the short and long-term, at
least some mandated disclosures will continue. Further, other kinds of mandated
communication will always be necessary, whether it is mandated between
businesses and consumers or between governments and the governed. And, if
mandated communication does exist, the legislatures that write the mandates and
the courts that interpret them should be making their decisions based on valid
theories of human behavior and comprehension. For that reason, this article will
refer to the people who read these documents-whether they are consumers, non-
custodial parents, or in some other role-as "readers."
Part I of this article will examine the kinds of statutes that mandate
communication and describe the different ways in which these statutes articulate
their communication mandates. Part II will explain how many mandated
communication statutes, and the court interpretations of those statutes, focus on
whether readers can see rather than whether they can read and understand the
relevant language, and are consistent with an understanding that the burden of
comprehension is on the reader to decipher the communication rather than on the
writer to present the information effectively. Finally, Part III will explain how our
knowledge of both human behavior and reader behavior reveals that the "rational
economic reader" does not exist, and will discuss how and why certain revision
methods can help legislator-writers to speed reader comprehension.
I. MANDATED COMMUNICATION STATUTES
Dozens of statutes mandate that certain information be conveyed in a certain
way between certain parties. Federal mandated communication is in the midst of a
sea change thanks to the work of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.21 This
18. See, e.g., id. at 221-22 (noting that contract clauses in plain English may cause adjudicators to
blame the less-sophisticated party-who should have understood the plain English language-for making a
poor choice.). Zacks argues that plain English contracts allow the more powerful party to misrepresent the
"contracting context" as being more equal than it actually was. Id.
19. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1382 (2011)
(observing with approval that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau "is authorized to ensure that con-
sumers are provided with timely and understandable information to make responsible decisions about finan-
cial transactions.") (internal quotations omitted).
20. See Zacks, supra note 2. He reasons that the existence of harmful clauses that are written in plain
English may bias the court to conclude that the unfair contract was the fault of the foolish person who agreed
to such an obviously unfair provision. Id at 221-22 (observing that anti-consumer effects on adjudicators
"may not be outweighed by any supposed benefit by the plain English to the contracting party, particularly if
it can be shown that such contracts are not read or understood regardless of presentation.") (internal citations
omitted).
21. The Bureau is committed to "communicating clearly and usefully to the public." Plain Writing,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/plain-writing/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
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article, therefore, will concentrate on the state statutes that mandate that certain
words, sentences, or paragraphs be included in a document in all caps or
"conspicuous type." 22 It is logical to conclude that all legislation that mandates
communication in this way is enacted to promote the understanding of the reader or
user of the information; otherwise, there is no reason to require particular
information in the documents, or to require that the information appear
conspicuously.
Many argue that mandatory disclosure statutes of this type do not achieve the
intended equalization of information or of bargaining power.23 Rather, these
scholars argue, the disclosure statutes provide a way to avoid more stringent
regulation; it might be preferable to "use the law to help the naYve" by "outlaw[ing]
practices that are too likely to result in disaster."24
The validity of the purposes behind these mandatory disclosure statutes is
beyond the scope of this article. Even if the purpose is a cynical one, however, it is
all the more important for the disclosures to be transparent. If consumers---or legal
scholars- understand the true cost of credit cards or the true risks of other
consumer contracts, they will be more likely to demand changes or to encourage
competition that will change the relevant industry.25
Further, "conspicuous text" disclosure statutes regulate not only
communications from a business to its customers; they also mandate
communications from various branches of government to the governed. These
statutes are not designed merely to allow a business to rake in higher profits from
consumers while saying "I told you so." They are often designed to promote
effective communication about various rights and responsibilities. It must always be
in the government's best interest for the governed to understand particular rules,
It specifically asks consumers to contact them if they see anything on its website that is not written in plain
language. Id.
22. Because "all caps" continues to be interpreted as meeting the standard for "conspicuous type," this
article will analyze both statutes that mandate conspicuous type and statutes that mandate all caps text.
23. See, e.g., Dee Pridgen, Putting Some Teeth in Tila: From Disclosure to Substantive Regulation in
the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, 24 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 615, 623 (2012)
(observing that, for example, "[tihe stress of the mortgage loan decision may also lead consumers to mistak-
enly make quick decisions to escape the stressful situation, rather than spend extra time and effort to under-
stand the parameters of the transaction being presented.").
24. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
647, 749 (2011); see also Pridgen, supra note 23 at 638-39 (noting that "specific targeted measures, such as
requiring that consumers have an ability to repay their loans; requiring that appraisers act independently from
brokers; eliminating confusing and potentially unfair forms of mortgage broker compensation such as yield
spread premiums; limiting unexpected traps such as prepayment penalties; and banning pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses, will likely provide much needed fairness in the home mortgage market.").
25. See Jeff Sovem, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How
the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 821 (2010) ("A somewhat
less politically unrealistic alternative would focus on creating competition to increase the likelihood that con-
sumers would read forms. For example, if regulators required lenders to conduct consumer testing of their
forms and then publicize the results, lenders might compete for higher comprehension scores. That is to say,
lenders might prefer not to disclose worse comprehension scores than their competitors, and so might increase
the intelligibility of their forms. A lender might not wish to disclose that, say, half its borrowers could not
understand its forms when other lenders reported that 80% of their customers understood their forms.").
8 [Vol. 40:1
Hiding in Plain Sight: "Conspicuous Type" Standards
regulations, and other information. 26
Statutes that mandate communication tend to fall into two categories. The first
category is made up of statutes that regulate business-to-consumer communication,
often as part of real estate transactions or other purchases that require a large outlay
of cash or a long-term payment plan. The second category is made up of statutes
that mandate communication to or from courts or other government entities.
Statutes in the business-to-consumer category include those that require
companies to write contracts or other documents that include mandatory
disclosures. These statutes are implicitly or explicitly based on the premise that
consumers will make better decisions if they have certain information about the
transaction, including the existence or non-existence, of certain rights or
provisions.27 Another premise is that the seller or other corporate entity who is
responsible for preparing the document is likely to hide or obfuscate certain
information; this problem is one of the obvious reasons that a legislature might
usurp the normal methods for communicating contractual terms. The federal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act,28 for example, regulates written materials sent to
debtors and has a goal of eliminating "abusive debt collection practices." 29
One of the most well-known mandatory disclosure statutes is the federal Truth
in Lending Act0 ("TILA"), which is now being administered by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau. TILA was enacted in 1968, and it is generally
regarded as having the goal of "reduc[ing] information asymmetries and
facilitat[ing] credit shopping." 31 One goal, according to the statute, is promoting the
"informed use of credit":
[t]he Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and
the competition among the various financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by
the informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an
awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this
subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect
the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
26. The Ohio child support enforcement statute, for example, requires that the support-paying parent
keep the relevant agency apprised of his or her current address and job status. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3121.29 (West 2013). To the extent that the parent does not inform the agency, the agency must track down
the information or take other onerous steps. Id. Thus, it is to the agency's benefit if the parent understands
the requirements and actually follows them.
27. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.301 (West 2012) (regarding signing of releases on behalf of minors);
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-77-50 (2012) (regarding advance health-care directives).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
29. Corson v. Accounts Receivable Mgmt., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 01903 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2013).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
31. Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-




Likewise, section (b) of the same statute, regarding terms of personal property
leases, provides that consumer leases of automobiles and other durable goods (as an
alternative to installment payment contracts for those items) have been offered
"without adequate cost disclosures."33  The statute therefore provided for
"meaningful disclosure of the terms of leases... to enable the lessee to compare
more readily the various lease terms available. . ., limit balloon payments in
consumer leasing, enable comparison of lease terms with credit terms where
appropriate, and to assure meaningful and accurate disclosures of lease terms in
advertisements." 34
In general, the reasoning behind mandatory disclosure requirements is ensuring
that certain information is reliably delivered to the consumer. For example, the
well-known Regulation Z, which was issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to implement the federal Truth in Lending Act, requires
that "[t]he creditor shall make the disclosures required by this subpart clearly and
conspicuously."3 5 The regulation specifies that "[t]he purpose of this regulation is
to promote the informed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its
terms and cost."36
Although state statutes that impose mandatory disclosure requirements do not
always state their purposes as explicitly as does TILA, many are like TILA in that
they are regulating a relationship between a more-sophisticated party and a less-
sophisticated party. The statutes virtually always require the more powerful party
to provide the designated information to the less powerful party. A Louisiana
statute that regulates time-share developers, for example, requires an all-caps
paragraph that describes the purchaser's right to cancel the contract,37 as do similar
statutes in several other states.38
The UCC mandates that contracts that want to exclude certain implied
warranties of fitness or merchantability must include "conspicuous" disclaimers as
well. 39 In analyzing this and similar provisions, courts frequently comment on the
importance of bringing the clauses "to the attention" or "to the notice" of the
consumer.40  The Texas Supreme Court has observed that "the object of the
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012).
33. 15 U.S.C.§ 1601(b) (2012).
34. Id.
35. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(1)(i) (2011).
36. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (2011).
37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131.10.1 (Westlaw through 2013 session).
38. See, e.g., TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 221.043 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
39. "[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language
must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof."' U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2002).
40. E.g., Am. States Ins. Co. v. Surbaugh, 745 S.E.2d 179, 184 (W. Va. 2013) ("An insurer wishing to
avoid liability on a policy purporting to give general or comprehensive coverage must make exclusionary
10 [Vol. 40:1
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conspicuousness requirement is to protect the buyer from surprise and an
unknowing waiver of his or her rights."A
Real estate liens, transfers, and foreclosures are also common subject matter for
mandated communication statutes. 42 Other statutes that include substantive and
typographic directives for mandatory disclosures cover subjects as wide-ranging as
internet dating43 and pre-need funeral contracts.44
Statutes that mandate communication from the government, rather than from a
seller, are (not surprisingly) often related to issues that require people to interact
with the court system. Many states mandate that courts or other government actors
include certain "conspicuous" information in child support orders,45 adoption
orders, 46 protection orders,47 or final judgments in foreclosure proceedings. 48 Other
statutes mandate language in documents that are submitted to a government entity
rather than created by a government actor. A South Carolina statute, for example,
mandates that certain language be included when people execute health care
directives. 49 The mandated communication includes language that seems designed
to ensure that the signer understands both the life-or-death import of the document
and how to revoke the authorization if desired.o
Both categories of mandated communication statutes use a variety of methods
to control what is said, where it is said, and how it is presented. Some statutes
seemingly mandate only categories of information, using language such as
"substantially the following," before a paragraph of information that may be copied,
or a list of elements that must be included.5' Other statutes, perhaps fearing those
clauses conspicuous, plain, and clear, placing them in such a fashion as to make obvious their relationship to
other policy terms, and must bring such provisions to the attention of the insured.") (internal citations omit-
ted).
41. Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex. 1990).
42. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.596 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
43. E.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 518/10 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56.8-171 (West, Westlaw thorugh 2013 session).
44. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.459 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (cancellation of, or de-
fault on, preneed contracts); see also ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 6206 (Westlaw through 2013 session) (con-
tinuing care contract).
45. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3121.29 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) ("Each support
order, or modification of a support order, shall contain a notice that states the following in boldface type and
in all capital letters"). But see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240-c (McKinney, Westlaw through 2013 session)
(which mandates that those applying for a support order must include conspicuous information).
46. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.35 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session 2013); MINN. R. 33.03
(2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-42.2 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
47. E.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/221 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session 2013); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 50C-5 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.130 (West,
Westlaw through 2013 session).
48. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.031 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (judicial sales procedure).
49. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Westlaw through 2013 session) (declaration of a desire for a
natural death).
50. See id
51. E.g., 11 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 43-101.2 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (providing
that a list "shall include a paragraph in bold, conspicuous type indicating the requirement for certain building
permit applicants to register with the Oklahoma Business Registration System of the Tax Commission"); TEx.
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who manipulate (or have manipulated) information in the past, dictate the exact
words, sentences, or paragraphs that must be used.52
When controlling where the mandated language is placed, legislators generally
focus on two locations: the front of the document, and, for contracts, the page on
which the parties must sign the contract. The legislatures are no doubt reasoning
(probably accurately) that readers are most likely to pay attention to these two
locations. A Louisiana statute, for example, requires that an all caps, "conspicuous
type" paragraph listing cancellation rights must be included "[i]mmediately prior to
the space reserved in the purchase contract for the signature of the purchaser." 53 A
New York statute provides that anyone who distributes a "simulated check" must
make certain that "the phrase 'THIS IS NOT A CHECK' [is] diagonally printed in
clear and conspicuous type on the front of such document." 54 A West Virginia
statute that regulates public offerings related to time shares requires that every
public offering "shall" contain a lengthy paragraph "in conspicuous type .. . on the
cover page"55 of the public offering. Likewise, when a car is identified as a "lemon"
under the relevant statute in South Carolina, the car's title must thenceforth "have
the following sentence printed on its face in large, bold, uppercase type:
'RETURNED TO MANUFACTURER UNDER LEMON LAW OR OTHER
PROCEEDING.,,' 56
While a number of these statutes mandate where the relevant information is to
be included, many more of them dictate how it is to be included. Although some
statutes state merely that the relevant document "shall contain" certain language,5 7
many mandate that the relevant information must be "conspicuous" or "in
conspicuous type." The UCC defines the term "conspicuous" as follows:
(10) "Conspicuous", with reference to a term, means so written,
displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to
operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is "conspicuous" or not
is for decision by the court. Conspicuous terms include the following:
(a) A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the
surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the
PROP. CODE ANN. § 222.008 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) ("If applicable, immediately before the
space reserved in the contract for the signature of the purchaser, in bold-faced and conspicuous type or print
that is larger than the type of print in the remaining text of the contract, substantially the following statement
must appear.. . .").
52. E.g., Continuing Care Provider Regulation Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-108 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 session).
53. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131.10.1 (Westlaw through 2013 session).
54. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-aa (McKinney, Westlaw through 2013 session).
55. W. VA. CODE § 36-9-6(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (the paragraph is illustrated in all
caps in the statute).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-490(A) (Westlaw through 2013 session).
57. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2621 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) ("Home service con-
tracts insured under a reimbursement insurance policy pursuant to subdivision E 1 of § 38.2-2619 shall con-
tain a statement in substantially the following form: 'Obligations of the provider under this home service
contract are insured under a home service contract reimbursement insurance policy,').
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surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and
(b) Language in the body of a record or display in larger type than
the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the
surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text
of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the
language.58
A variety of mandated communication statutes (from both categories) echo these
typographic requirements. Many statutes provide only that the information must
appear "in conspicuous type," perhaps relying on the UCC definition. Others start
with the term "conspicuous," but add one or more modifiers to make their point
more strongly. Statutes require that language be included "in bold and conspicuous
type,"59 in "large conspicuous type," 60 or in "clear and conspicuous type."61
Some states give alternatives to document drafters, permitting language to be
presented "in bold face or other conspicuous type or lettering," 62 but many more
add various mandates, including requirements that language must appear in "bold
and conspicuous type of at least 10-point type"'66 or "in boldfaced and conspicuous
type which shall be larger than the type in the remaining text of the contract."64
Some statutes impose other graphic requirements, mandating that language appear
"in conspicuous type, circumscribed by a line," 65 or "clear and conspicuous type,
surrounded by bold black lines."66 A statute that has been adopted in several states,
and that regulates mulch-seed-fertilizer, requires that certain words appear in "the
largest and most conspicuous type on the container, equal to or larger than the
product name."67
Likewise, statutes that mandate all caps (rather than "conspicuous type") do so
in several different ways. Some statutes micromanage the typography; a
Pennsylvania statute that regulates eviction notices provides as follows:
The following statement of the tenant's rights, the words and phrases of
which appear all in capital letters to be printed in 12-point bold-faced
type with the first letter printed in upper case and the letters that follow in
lower case and the words and phrases which do not appear all in capital
58. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §1301.201(B)(10) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-108(b)(27) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
60. CAL STS. & HIGH. CODE § 3114.5(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
61. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 6516(d)(5)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).; see also N.J.
STAT. ANN. 39:4-10.8(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 140-a (McKin-
ney, Westlaw through 2013 session).
62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-804(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
63. MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 14-2503(e)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
64. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-9-5(f) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
65. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4420 (Westlaw through 2013 session) (vehicle dealer requirements).
66. IND. CODE § 28-1-29-8.6 (repealed 2013) (cancellation of agreement).




letters to be printed in ten-point type, with any letter in upper case to
remain so and the rest in lower case. 68
Other statutes are a little less fussy. One statute requires that the relevant
information appear "prominently printed in no less than 10-point uppercase type," 69
while another mandates "upper case boldface type of a minimum size of ten
points," 70 and another requires "12-point or larger underlined uppercase type."71
Some statutes, perhaps recognizing that some of those creating these documents
may still be using typewriters, impose one requirement on "printed" information
and another on "typewritten," mandating that the information must be "printed in
14-point boldface type or 14-point uppercase typewritten letters." 72
The information in most mandated communication statutes is meant to help the
reader to make informed decisions. Sometimes those decisions are imminent, as
with a contract or waiver that is about to be signed. At other times, the information
relates to decisions about future events, as with a court order or health-care
directive. The differing descriptions of how the relevant language is to be presented
all focus on making the information more emphatic: it must be "conspicuous,"
"bold," "bold and conspicuous," "large," "larger," or "largest." This craving for
more and more emphasis makes clear that the mandated communication in these
statutes is important. Unfortunately, in too many cases, the emphatic devices that
legislatures use serve only to allow readers to see that the information exists; they
do nothing to insure that the reader can read, let alone understand, the relevant
language.
II. HOW THE LANGUAGE OF MANDATED COMMUNICATION STATUTES AND COURT
INTERPRETATIONS PUTS THE BURDEN OF COMPREHENSION ON THE READER
In one of Aesop's Fables, the Sun and the Wind have a debate over which of
them is more powerful.73 They decide to settle the debate by seeing who can force a
man to take his cloak off.74 The wind blows and blows, but the man resolutely
hangs onto his cloak, even wrapping it around himself more tightly. 75 Then it is the
sun's turn. The sun begins to shine, making the day warmer and warmer.76
Eventually, the man decides on his own to remove his cloak.77 The moral of the
68. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1526(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
69. CAL. INS. CODE § 786(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
70. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 653(1) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2013 session).
71. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21(3) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
72. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.074(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (emphasis added).
73. See Aesop's Fables, BARTLEBY.COM, http://www.bartleby.com/17/1/60.html (last visited Nov. 14,
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story is that "kindness effects more than severity."78
Too many mandated communication statutes act like the wind in the old fable:
they blow and bluster with all caps and conspicuous type mandates, trying to force
readers to read the required information. But the small fonts and all-caps
presentation style are too severe to promote reader engagement. Further, even if the
readers would take the trouble to read the language, it is too often written in a stiff,
noun-heavy style, using vocabulary and sentence structures that even sophisticated
readers would struggle to decipher, sounding like so much wind to the
unsophisticated readers who will often encounter them.
When writing mandated communication statutes, legislators should treat
readers with kindness rather than severity. Plain English mandates, which are
famously reader-centered, 79 have had some notable successes, but they have yet to
be widely adopted by state legislators. Although it is impossible to determine
precisely why legislators don't treat readers with more kindness, they may be
influenced by court interpretations of reader encounters with the written word.
Courts that analyze reader responsibilities in various contexts intentionally or
unintentionally impose a burden of comprehension on readers, even when the
apparent purpose of the legislation is providing information to the reader.
Legislators reflect this attitude when they draft statutes whose "conspicuousness"
mandates ensure a focus on whether the reader can see or find the relevant
language, rather than on the whether the information is comprehensible.
A. Successes and Failures in Mandated Communication
The Modem Plain English movement is said to have begun in 1975, when
CitiBank of New York simplified its promissory note statement, reducing it from
3,000 words to 600.80 As one author characterizes it, the movement "'advocates for
communication in language that an average person can understand."' 81 The
movement has had many successes. Many states now mandate that insurance
policies be written in plain English.82 A continuing success is the SEC's mandate
78. Id.
79. See Joseph Kimble, Answering the Critics of Plain Language, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 51, 65
(1995) ("In a 1980 study of an administrative rule by the Document Design Center, inexperienced readers of
the original rule got an average of 8.54 questions right out of 20; on the plain-language version, they got an
average of 17.26 questions right, for an improvement of 102%. Even experienced readers of the rule improved
by 29%. In addition, the average response time improved from 2.97 minutes to 1.62 minutes.").
80. Kali Jensen, The Plain English Movement's Shifting Goals, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 807, 810
(2010).
81. Id. at 807 (citing George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 333, 346 (1987)).
82. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-38-30 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) ("Any policy filed
with the Commissioner must be accompanied by a certified Flesch scale readability analysis and test score
and by the insurer's certification that the policy is, in the insurer's judgment, readable based on the factors
specified in G.S. 58-38-20 and G.S. 58-38-25."); Gopen, supra note 81, at 337. But see Louis J. Sirico, Jr.,
Readability Studies: How Technocentrism Can Compromise Research and Legal Determinations, 26 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REv. 147 (2007) (analyzing accuracy and validity of computer-based readability test and concluding
that readability software must be used with care).
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that prospectuses be written in Plain English, which is still in force. 3 A recent
shining example is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, whose focus
includes improving the readability of mandatory disclosures. 84 The Bureau has
started an aggressive campaign to rewrite and redesign lending documents. Its
"Know Before You Owe" program has used design experts, crowdsourcing, and
other innovative methods both to redesign the lending documents and to get
information to the public at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way. 85
Admittedly, some mandated communication statutes use language that is easy
to read and understand. A New Hampshire contract that regulates public adjusters,
for example, imposes a readable mandate on certain contracts:
A statement printed in not less than bold, 12-point type, which shall state,
in substance: "You have the right, at your option, to rescind this contract
at any time within 3 business days after the end of the day you sign it.
Should you wish to discuss this matter with the New Hampshire
insurance department, it can be reached, toll-free, by dialing 1-800-852-
3416.
Unfortunately, however, too many other statutes present language in ways that
are challenging to both the eye and the brain. As shown above, child support
orders-which are issued to readers at all levels of sophistication 87-may be
presented in all caps, may contain too many unfamiliar terms (like "obligor" and
"obligee"), and may contain too many sentences that readers must struggle to
understand. Here is just the first sentence of three paragraphs that must be included
in certain motions for child support in New York:
A COURT ORDER OF SUPPORT RESULTING FROM A
PROCEEDING COMMENCED BY THIS APPLICATION (MOTION)
SHALL BE ADJUSTED BY THE APPLICATION OF A COST OF
LIVING ADJUSTMENT AT THE DIRECTION OF THE SUPPORT
COLLECTION UNIT NO EARLIER THAN TWENTY-FOUR
83. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2011) (mandating writing style for prospectuses, including provision that
provides, at sub-section (d)(1), "[t]o enhance the readability of the prospectus, you must use plain English
principles in the organization, language, and design of the front and back cover pages, the summary, and the
risk factors section.").
84. The Bureau is responsible for implementing and enforcing a variety of laws that mandate disclo-
sures to consumers, including the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"),
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA"), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and the
Truth in Savings Act ("TISA"). See Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1141, 1148-49 (2012) (listing laws
that the Bureau is charged with implementing and enforcing).
85. See Know Before You Owe, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
86. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402-D:13(I)(k) (Westlaw through 2013 session).
87. See, e.g., Karen Stonecypher, Creating a Patient Education Tool, 40 J. CONTINUING EDUC. NURS-
ING 462, 462-63 (2009) ("Approximataely 40% of adults in the United States are poor readers, with only 25%
reading at a 10th grade level.").
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MONTHS AFTER SUCH ORDER IS ISSUED, LAST MODIFIED OR
LAST ADJUSTED, UPON THE REQUEST OF ANY PARTY TO THE
ORDER OR PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH (2) BELOW. 8
There are mandated communication provisions whose sentences are written in Plain
English style, with more active voice verbs and uses of "you" and "we" as subjects.
But because these provisions are often presented in mandated all-caps style, and
contain no headings or other context cues, they still place needless burdens on the
reader. A Louisiana statute regulating language that appears in time-share purchase
contracts includes many well-written sentences:
YOU MAY CANCEL THIS PURCHASE CONTRACT WITHOUT
ANY PENALTY OR OBLIGATION WITHIN SEVEN DAYS FROM
THE DATE YOU SIGN THIS PURCHASE CONTRACT, AND UNTIL
SEVEN DAYS AFTER YOU RECEIVE THE PUBLIC OFFERING
STATEMENT, WHICHEVER IS LATER. IF YOU DECIDE TO
CANCEL THIS PURCHASE CONTRACT, YOU MUST NOTIFY THE
DEVELOPER IN WRITING OF YOUR INTENT TO CANCEL. YOUR
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION SHALL BE EFFECTIVE UPON THE
DATE SENT AND SHALL BE SENT TO.. .(NAME OF
DEVELOPER). . ... .(ADDRESS OF DEVELOPER)False ANY
ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A WAIVER OF YOUR CANCELLATION
RIGHT IS UNLAWFUL.
Readers need more than just better sentence structure, however. As will be
discussed below, myriad features of the written word can encourage or discourage
reader engagement with the text.
The legislative process has some natural impediments to the widespread use of
Plain English. The complexity of the legislative process means that legislators have
many different audiences when they draft or sponsor legislative language. They
may be trying to gather votes of constituents by legislating on a popular or
controversial issue, or they may be trying to garner legislative votes for a bill by
including a clause that addresses a pet issue of fellow legislators. Further, once a
legislator has been promised even one vote by a colleague, it may be difficult to
change language without having to begin the process of vote-gathering all over
again. Finally, some language may be left vague on purpose, with the knowledge
that the legislators cannot anticipate every application of the statute, or with the
assurance that the courts are in a better position to interpret the language on a case-
by-case basis.
However true these concerns may be when it comes to most statutes, they
should be irrelevant when drafting mandated communication. Mandated
88. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240-c(5)(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2013 session) ("All applications
or motions by the support collection unit or by persons seeking support enforcement services .. . shall on their
face in conspicuous type state [the following three all-caps paragraphs).").
89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131.10.1 (Westlaw through 2013 session).
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communication should have just one audience: the reader of the document that will
include the mandated communication. Legislatures should expend all reasonable
effort to ensure that the relevant information is communicated effectively to that
audience.
B. Court Interpretations ofReader Behaviors
When courts analyze statutes and other legal pronouncements, they usually
don't think in terms of "readers" and "writers." Perhaps they should. After all, in
the twenty-first century, governments don't use town criers anymore; the main way
that a government communicates with the governed is through the written word.
The law imposes some high expectations on readers, but both legislators and judges
seem not to be aware of the impact that ineffective writing and presentation can
have on whether readers will understand text-or whether they will even read it.
Analysis of reading behaviors is implicit in myriad court decisions. Three
categories of cases, however, are particularly illustrative of some of the
expectations that are imposed on readers: (1) cases in which defendants raise
"ignorance of the law" as a defense; (2) cases in which courts apply the "least
sophisticated debtor" standard; and, finally, (3) cases in which courts interpret
"conspicuous type" statutes and other mandated communication statutes.
Opinions in the first two categories of cases may refer to the high burden put on
readers, and these cases are also more likely to at least acknowledge the act of
reading. Cases in the third category, however, are more limited in focus due to
legislative language that mandates only "conspicuousness." This standard shifts the
focus to the act of "seeing" rather than the act of reading. Implicit in these
opinions-as it is in the statutes they analyze-is the presumption that the reader is
responsible for reading and deciphering any language that is legible. While this
presumption may be logical in "ignorance of the law" cases, it makes no sense in
statutes that are supposedly written with the goal of promoting a reader's
understanding of legal rights or responsibilities.
1. Ignorance of the Law Cases & Least Sophisticated Debtor Cases
One of the most well-settled tenets in the American legal system is that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse." 90 Although there are rare exceptions,91 this
standard applies in civil92 as well as criminal cases.93 Courts consider that mere
90. See, e.g., United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2000) ( "[The defendant] acknowl-
edges, as he must, that his position is in direct conflict with the 'common maxim, familiar to all minds, that
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally."') (citing Barlow v. United
States, 32 U.S. 404,411 (1833)).
91. See Lambert v. Cahfornia, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (allowing an "ignorance of the law" defense for a
defendant who did not register as a felon when visiting a city that had a law requiring him to do so.) The
court noted that it allowed the defense because the defendant's behavior was "passive" and there were no
circumstances that would alert the wrongdoer that his behavior was illegal. Id.
92. See, e.g., Sparks v. White, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 86, 90 (1846) ("That a mere naked ignorance of the
law will not be sufficient to authorize a court of chancery to set aside a contract is well settled.").
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"publication" of a criminal statute is sufficient to provide notice to those to whom
the statute applies. 94 In analyzing statutes of limitations in the habeas context and
others, courts have refused to toll time limitations for reasons of deafness, illiteracy,
or lack of legal sophistication.95 These decisions are based on an expectation that
even those who cannot read will take the steps needed to gain knowledge about all
laws that may regulate their behavior. Courts justify the "ignorance of the law"
holding by indicating that it is a legal fiction,96 but a necessary one: "If a person
accused of a crime could shield himself behind the defense that he was ignorant of
the law which he violated, immunity from punishment would in most cases
result." 97
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a conviction despite the
defendant's claim that he had been unaware of a federal licensing requirement when
he sold firearms.98 The court observed that when a statute requires "knowing"
behavior, "the background presumption that every citizen knows the law makes it
unnecessary to adduce specific evidence to prove that 'an evil-meaning mind'
directed the 'evil-doing hand."' 99
In the civil context, a Georgia appellate court refused to allow plaintiffs in a
class action to recover late fees they had paid that may have been imposed
illegally.' 00 The court, writing at the turn of this century, observed that "when
payment is made through mere ignorance of the law, it is not recoverable," 01
quoting with approval an 1881 decision in which the court observed that "[w]hen
93. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194-196 (1998).
94. See, e.g., Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1300 (1st Cir. 1995) (Cyr, J., concurring) ("As a general
rule, of course, publication of a criminal statute affords adequate notice to the public at large.").
95. See, e.g., Butler v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, 6:13CV368, 2013 WL 4035645 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2013) ("It
should be noted that the Fifth Circuit has expressly held that proceeding pro se, illiteracy, deafiness, lack of
legal training, and unfamiliarity with the legal process are insufficient reasons to equitably toll the statute of
limitations.") (citing Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 2000); Baker v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., No.
09-17371, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11507 at *2-3 (9th Cir. June 7, 2012) ("Low literacy levels, lack of legal
knowledge, and need for some assistance to prepare a habeas petition are not extraordinary circumstances to
warrant equitable tolling of an untimely habeas petition.") (cited sources omitted); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448
F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[A] pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an ex-
traordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.").
96. E.g., In re Di Maggio, 65 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1946) ("The maxim, 'Ignorance
of the law is no excuse,' assumes that people do know all the law. And that is a fiction. Adults do not know all
the law. Lawyers do not know all the law and judges are in no better position.").
97. People v. Snyder, 652 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1982) ("It is an emphatic postulate of both civil and penal
law that ignorance of a law is no excuse for a violation thereof. Of course it is based on a fiction, because no
man can know all the law, but it is a maxim which the law itself does not permit any one to gainsay .... The
rule rests on public necessity; the welfare of society and the safety of the state depend upon its enforcement. If
a person accused of a crime could shield himself behind the defense that he was ignorant of the law which he
violated, immunity from punishment would in most cases result.") (citation omitted).
98. Bryan, supra note 93, at 193.
99. Id. at 193-95 (the court refused to remand to address the interpretation of "willfully," indicating
that the defendant's statements to his straw purchasers showed that he was aware that this conduct was unlaw-
ful, and that the law did not require him to be aware of the specific statute he was violating) (internal citations
omitted).
100. Telescripps Cable Co. v. Welsh, 542 S.E.2d 640, 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
101. Id. at 285.
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money is paid with a full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances upon which
it is demanded, or with the means of such knowledge, it cannot be recovered back
upon the ground that the party supposed he was bound in law to pay, when in truth
he was not." 102 In other words, the court put the burden of knowledge or
investigation on the plaintiffs who had received a bill for a late payment fee and
paid it. Since they did not research the laws regulating whether the company had
the legal authority to enforce that debt before they made the payment, they had no
right to recover.
Although courts analyzing "ignorance of the law" claims explicitly presume
that the "reader" has knowledge of the law, courts applying the "least sophisticated
debtor" standard will often actively consider the words used in debt notices and
analyze whether the reader understands them. Courts use the "least sophisticated
debtor" standard when analyzing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. These
cases show both the range of techniques that writers will use to mislead readers, and
courts' sometimes-uninformed knowledge of common reader behaviors.
The Act is "'a remedial statute aimed at curbing what Congress considered to
be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing debtors."' 10 3 hen
analyzing debt notices, courts use a "least sophisticated debtor" standard, and find
actionable notices that could "mislead" or "deceive" those debtors.104 Even with
this generous-sounding language, courts aim to avoid "bizarre or idiosyncratic
interpretations of collection notices" by presuming, perhaps optimistically, that
consumers have "a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with
care."105
The purpose of the Act, and of the standard used to interpret it, is to protect
consumers from lenders. As the third circuit observed in 2006, "[a]nalyzing lender-
debtor communications from this perspective is consistent with 'basic consumer-
protection principles.,"' 06 That court reversed a district court decision and held that
a debt-collection letter was misleading when it said that the collection agency
"could" initiate legal proceedings, disagreeing with the district court's distinction
between "the conditional term 'could' as opposed to the affirmative term 'will."'
0 7
The court noted that due to the use of the term "could," "the least sophisticated
debtor might get the impression that litigation or referral to a CSC lawyer would be
imminent if he or she did not respond within five days." 08
It may be inappropriate to presume that a reader will "read with care" when the
notice provided is difficult or confusing, and courts, unfortunately, do not always
recognize predictable reader weaknesses. In 2012, for example, a New Jersey
102. Id. at 285 (quoting White v. Rowland, 67 Ga. 546, 557 (1881) (emphasis added)).
103. Heathman v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, No. 12-CV-515-LEG RBB, 2013 WL 3746111,
at *1, *2 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2013) (quoting Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F.3d
1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006)).
104. See, e.g., Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450,454 (3d Cir. 2006).
105. Id. at 454.
106. Id. at 453 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir.1996)).
107. Brown 464 F.3d at 454.
108. Id. at 455.
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District Court was called on to interpret a debt collection notice that included
information required by the Act.109 After the document provided initial identifying
information, it included the following paragraph:
YOU OWE $2854.04. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, WRITE THE
UNDERSIGNED OR CALL 1-866-415-2398. UNLESS YOU NOTIFY
THIS OFFICE WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE
THAT YOU DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF THIS DEBT OR ANY
PORTION THEREOF, THIS OFFICE WILL ASSUME THIS DEBT IS
VALID. IF YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE IN WRITING WITHIN 30
DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE THAT YOU DISPUTE
THE VALIDITY OF This [sic] DEBT OR ANY PORTION THEREOF,
THIS OFFICE WILL OBTAIN A VERIFICATION OF THE DEBT OR
OBTAIN A COPY OF A JUDGMENT AND MAIL YOU A COPY OF
SUCH JUDGMENT OR VERIFICATION. IF YOU REQUEST THIS
OFFICE IN WRITING WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS
NOTICE THIS OFFICE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH THE NAME
AND ADDRESS OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR, IF DIFFERENT
FROM THE CURRENT CREDITOR."l0
Thus, after listing the amount owed, the message said, "for further information,
write the undersigned or call 1-866-415-2398. Unless you notify this office within
30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any
portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid.""' If you are the debtor
reading that notice, you may think you've been told to call or write for more
information, and that calling or writing will serve as valid options for "notifying"
the office if you dispute the validity of the debt. And if you then turned your
attention to the signature line of the letter, you would find the name of the account
representative, with the phone number just below the signature line.
You might think you would be justified in concluding that calling the office is a
valid way to provide notice that you dispute the validity of the debt, but you would
be wrong. The sentence following "unless you notify this office," states: "if you
notify this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice that you
dispute the validity of this debt or any portion of thereof, this office will obtain a
verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such
judgment or verification.""12
The plaintiff argued that the letter was "confusing" because "the least
sophisticated consumer could believe he could dispute the debt by either writing or
calling when, by law, he could only dispute the debt in writing."" 3 The court
109. See Ardino v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., 2:11-CV-06520 WJM, 2012 WL 2036817 (D.N.J. June 6,
2012).
110. Id. at *1.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2.
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disagreed, observing that the letter included the information mandated by the Act,
and observed that "[n]umerous courts have held that the inclusion of a telephone
number and an instruction to call does not contradict or overshadow" an otherwise
valid document. 114
This conclusion is surprising, given that the letter never says explicitly that only
a written request can serve as valid notice. As will be noted below, those who study
reader behavior note that writing is more demanding when it requires readers to
draw inferences.11 5 This letter gives information about telephoning and writing; the
reader must read between the lines - i.e., draw inferences - to determine that getting
"more information" (which can be obtained by writing or making a phone call) is
not the same as challenging the debt (which can happen only by writing).
The court did not believe that the required inference was significant, observing,
"[r]eview of the entirety of the Communication reveals that a proper dispute must
be made in writing. Plaintiff's interpretation requires the reader to ignore his own
common sense and is the kind of idiosyncratic interpretation that the Court need not
heed, even under the low bar of the least sophisticated debtor standard."l 6 The
court's basis for this conclusion is unclear, as neither the words "must" or "proper"
are in the quoted language. The court's definition of reading "with care" burdens
readers - especially "least sophisticated" readers - by expecting them to draw
inferences that may or may not be intuitive. It is apparent that some courts have
high expectations of reader competence and performance.
2. Mandated Communication Statutes that Require "Conspicuous" Type
Court analysis of mandated communication statutes varies according to the
specificity of the mandate, but that analysis is necessarily limited in cases in which
the legislation has already validated the adequacy of the words by mandating the
specific text. If the statute mandates the words and then micromanages the
presentation of those words, courts will make generally straightforward factual
findings as to whether the words were printed in the appropriate type size.1 17 If the
statute mandates only that the mandated communication be "conspicuous," courts
typically engage in more detailed analysis to determine whether the language was
situated in a way that allowed the reader to "notice" it, and whether it was
114. Id. at 3.
115. See Rebekah George Benjamin, Reconstructing Readability: Recent Developments and Recom-
mendations in the Analysis of Text Difficulty, 24 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REv. 63, 70 (2012) (recommending "highly
cohesive" texts for weak readers, observing that in highly cohesive text, "inferences are explicit and the reader
does not have to fill many gaps using his or her own knowledge about the topic. ... [h]owever, in a text
where less propositional overlap exists, the reader will be required to fill gaps of information with his or her
own knowledge").
116. Ardino v. Fin. Recovery Servs., lnc.,2:1I-CV-06520 WJM, 2012 WL 2036817, at 4.
117. See, e.g., Charbonnet v. Shami, 04-12-00711 -CV, 2013 WL 2645720 (Tex. Ct. App. June 12,
2013) ("The release signed by Cathy contained not only a larger heading, but also text of a legible size in a
bold font").
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sufficiently legible.118  In very few of these situations do courts address
comprehensibility; they rarely get beyond "noticeability" and "legibility."
Statutes that mandate conspicuous type often call for court interpretation by
definition. As noted above, the U.C.C. definition of "conspicuous," which has been
adopted in numerous states, provides that "[w]hether a term is 'conspicuous' or not
is for decision by the court." 1 9 Many states have created their own definitions of
"conspicuous type." As you will not be surprised to learn, the definitions vary.
Some states mandate all-caps as part of the definition of "conspicuous"; Louisiana's
statute provides in part that "'[c]onspicuous type' means type in boldfaced capital
letters no smaller than the largest type, exclusive of headings, on the page on which
it appears and, in all cases, at least ten-point type." 20 Several jurisdictions specify
a minimum point size (generally ten points),121 require bold-faced type,122 or
both.123  The Louisiana statute referenced above (and a similar Florida statute)
define conspicuous as a size that is "no smaller than" the surrounding type,124 but
other statutes mandate that the conspicuous type must be "at least two points larger"
than other type,125 with a Georgia statute stating that the conspicuous type must be
"larger," without specifying how much larger the type must be.126
Because conspicuousness often depends on context, several statutes impose
requirements on what surrounds the mandatory language. Of course, the statutes
that have mandated larger type have guaranteed that the language surrounding the
conspicuous type will be smaller. Interestingly, at least one statute mandates that in
certain kinds of statutes, conspicuous type may be used only for the mandated
language.127  Presumably, this limit is meant to prevent document drafters from
printing an entire document in "conspicuous type." For, of course, when everything
is conspicuous, nothing is conspicuous.
118. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Hidden Valley Golf & Ski, Inc., ED98704, 2013 WL 2181247 (Mo. Ct. App.
May 21, 2013) ("The title of the Contract, which stated that Guthrie was acknowledging the risk of snow
tubing and agreeing not to sue Defendants, was printed in all capital letters at the top of the page in large,
readable type.... [t]hus, the Contract's exculpatory language was conspicuous and obvious to Guthrie and
sufficient to uphold Guthrie's agreement not to sue Defendants.").
119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-201 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
120. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131.2 (Westlaw through 2013 session); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
718.103 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (containing nearly identical language: .'[c]onspicuous type'
means bold type in capital letters no smaller than the largest type, exclusive of headings, on the page on which
it appears and, in all cases, at least ten-point type.").
121. E.g., P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. XXXI § 1251b (Westlaw through 2013 session).
122. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-20-4 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
123. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-162 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
124. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.103 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:1131.2 (Westlaw through 2013 session).
125. E.g., CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11212 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) ("Type in upper and
lower case letters two point sizes larger than the nearest nonconspicuous type").
126. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-162 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (defining a "[c]onspicuous
statement" as "a statement in boldface and conspicuous type of at least ten points, such statements always
being larger than all other statements, except for other conspicuous statements" in the document).
127. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.. § 9:1131.2 (Westlaw through 2013 session) (providing that




Some statutes mandate (or allow) other methods to make the conspicuous type
stand out. An Indiana statute largely tracks the U.C.C. definition, and defines
conspicuous type as including "[t]yping in capitals or underlined" and "[p]lacement
of text in a separate or otherwise noticeable location." 28 Similarly, some statutes
provide that "conspicuous type" must be "separated on all sides from other type and
print."l 29
Conspicuous type statutes are spread throughout the statute books, covering
topics as diverse as mortgages, recycling, and ballot design.'30 Much of the
litigation emerges from U.C.C.-type statutes; nevertheless, court analysis of
conspicuous type is emblematic of an attitude that puts the "burden of
comprehension" on the reader rather than the writer.
When analyzing whether language meets the conspicuousness requirement,
courts first ask whether the complaining party would have been able to find and
physically read the relevant language. If the language was "buried in fine print,"' 3'
or in dense language within a long contract, courts will be more likely to question
the validity of the disclosure. They may also be willing to find lack of
conspicuousness if a paragraph's title was misleading as to its true content.132
Likewise, courts may be more stringent in their analysis of conspicuousness if
the relevant language acts to waive a significant right or warranty, particularly if
waivers of that type are discouraged in the relevant jurisdiction. In 2012, for
example, a Maryland court refused to uphold a waiver of a jury trial, noting that
"the law does not presume the waiver of constitutional rights" and that waiver
language was not "conspicuous" because it was "listed on page fifteen of a thirty-
two page asset purchase agreement; page five of an eighteen page senior
promissory note; and page four of a twenty-one page subordinate promissory
note."1 33
On the other hand, courts are less likely to be sympathetic to plaintiffs who
admit that they noticed the language but did not read it, 134 often using language that
128. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-20-4 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
129. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-103dd (West, Westlaw through 2013 session).
130. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48A-1 (Westlaw through 2013 session) (mortgages); UTAH
CODE ANN. 1953 § 61-2d-105 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (recycling bins); W. VA. CODE § 3-5-10
(West, Westlaw through 2013 session) (ballots).
131. Cole v. U.S. Capital, 389 F.3d 719, 731 (7th Cir. 2004) (refusing to find conspicuousness, noting
"[t]he type in this disclaimer fairly can be described as disproportionately small compared to the surrounding
text; indeed, its size approaches that which cannot be read with the naked eye. The text is the smallest text on
a page that is filled with larger type, as well as type that is bolded and italicized. The notice does nothing to
draw the reader's attention to this material; to the contrary, the flyer appears to be designed to ensure minimal
attention by the reader.").
132. See, e.g., Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Barratt An., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19016, *12 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29,
1995) (noting that "[a]n exclusion is not conspicuous if it is placed under a heading whose ordinary meaning
does not encompass the condition purportedly excluded," and finding insurance company's heading was not
conspicuous because it did not accurately label an exclusion).
133. Ohio Learning Ctrs., LLC v. Sylvan Learning, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102784, 23-24 (D. Md.
July 24, 2012).
134. See, e.g., Van Voris v. Team Chop Shop, LLC, 2013 LEXIS 7011, 6-7 (Tex. App. Dallas June 7,
2013) (refusing to consider plaintiffs allegations that the relevant language was in seven-point font and not-
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echoes language used by courts addressing an "ignorance of the law" defense.
Courts have held that those who are insured have a "duty to read" the policy and
that "[a] reasonable person will read the coverage provisions of an insurance policy
to ascertain the scope of what is covered."135 The court observed that "the insured
is 'bound by clear and conspicuous provisions in the policy even if evidence
suggests that the insured did not read or understand them."'
1 36
In 2011, a California court granted a defendant manufacturer's summary
judgment motion on a failure to warn issue because the plaintiff admitted that he
had never read the one-inch by two-inch warning on his wakeboarding boots.137
The court rejected plaintiffs argument that the warning had been "significantly
larger" in the memorandum to the court than it had been in reality, noting that the
plaintiff did not allege lack of conspicuousness. 138
Although courts do not always specify why they find that the language was
conspicuous, or whether conspicuous language was or was not in all-caps text, they
frequently cite all-caps text as all or part of the reason that the language meets the
conspicuousness standard. In 2013, a court that was analyzing a disclaimer noted
that the "[p]laintiff s contention that the disclaimer language is not sufficiently
conspicuous to be operative is unavailing. . . . [t]he disclaimer is printed in all-
capital letters, and dominates the conditions of sale set forth at the bottom of the
invoice."1 39
Interestingly, although courts routinely chide plaintiffs for failing to read all-
caps text, they have often recognized, both implicitly and explicitly, that all-caps
typefaces are difficult to read. In court opinions, it is not unusual to see language
quoted from contracts or other documents followed by a parenthetical that notes "all
caps omitted." 40 Further, some courts state explicitly that they have changed the
ing that the plaintiff does not "state he cannot read the document-rather, he asserts he did not read the docu-
ment before he signed it."); see also Zacks, supra note 2, at 174 ("with respect to assessing contract choices
and contract outcomes, judges and juries are inclined to blame the contracting 'victim' and that person's dis-
position for the poor choice or outcome rather than any situational influences"). But see Anderson v.
Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("the location and conspicuousness of the warnings
(whether that be based on label or letter size, color, or other attributes of conspicuousness), and the role those
factors played in the plaintiffs failure to read them, as well as the content and clarity of those warnings, are
disputed issues in this case, and the plaintiff's failure to read the warnings should not, in and of itself, prevent
the 'failure to warn' claim from going before the jury.").
135. Hadland v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 24 Cal. App. 4th 1578, 1586 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1994)
(upholding dismissal of fraud claim because of insureds' failure to read the policy).
136. Id.
137. See Altman v. HO Sports Co., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
138. Id at 1190 ("Altman makes no argument that the warning was too small or insufficiently conspic-
uous, and that this lack of conspicuousness is the reason that he failed to read the warning.").
139. W. 63 Empire Assoc., v. Walker & Zanger, Inc., 107 A.D.3d 586, 586 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
(internal citations omitted).
140. E.g., Plummer Street Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 671 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012)
(noting "all caps omitted"); Calef v. Citibank, 11 -cv-526-JL, 2013 WL 653951 (D.N.H. 2013) (concluding
that plaintiff could not challenge a foreclosure sale after the fact, at least in part because he had been "ap-
prised of his right" to file a petition enjoining the sale before it occurred.) In quoting the notice of his right to
file the petition, the court noted that "[t]he original was entirely capitalized; the court has employed lower-
case text here for readability's sake." Id.
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text to lowercase type for the purpose of readability or legibility. 141
Another judge acknowledged that reading all-caps is "harder," but refused to
find that this difficulty would affect a finding of conspicuousness. The judge
criticized a plaintiff who complained that a clause was "buried" on page twenty-six
of a thirty page document, noting that:
"[T]he entirety of the provision describing the arbitration agreement,
including the class arbitration waiver and limitations on costs, attorney
fees, and damages, is written in CAPITAL LETTERS. Together, these
stylistic choices call a reader's attention to the importance of the
provision placed in the middle of an extensive document. To be sure, text
in all capital letters is harder to read in the sense of taking longer to read,
but all capitalization does draw attention to the provision. In other words,
the provision is not only not 'buried,' it is actually highlighted." 42
If legislators are serious about using mandated communication statutes as a
method of transmitting information, they must do more than demand that poorly
written language be displayed "conspicuously" in the relevant documents.
"Conspicuousness" guarantees only that the reader is able to see that the language
exists and is able to discern individual letters and words, with sufficient effort. To
ensure that these documents actually inform readers, legislators must make use of
current knowledge of human behavior and reader behavior, and they must write and
design mandated communication statutes in a way that will actually achieve their
communicative goals.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND READER BEHAVIOR
The legislative and judicial focus on "noticeability" for the language in
mandated communication statutes shortchanges readers. As noted, the U.C.C.
definition of "conspicuousness" requires mainly that the text be "so written,
displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought
to have noticed it."1 43 This standard says, in essence, that the reader should be able
to see that the information is on the page. Making sure that text is able to be seen,
however, does nothing to make sure that the text is easily readable or easily
understandable. After all, text written in all-caps in German would be noticeable,
but most American consumers would not find it to be readable or comprehensible.
By focusing on noticeability, legislatures may ignore the burden of comprehension
that their text can impose on readers. Implicit in these "noticeability" requirements
141. Randall v. Lady of Am. Franchise Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (D. Minn. 2007) ("Section
12.2 is in all capital letters in the franchise agreement. For the sake of legibility, the Court reproduces the
relevant language here in upper and lower case; see Robbins, supra note 4, at 115-18 (discussing why text in
all capital letters is hard to read).
142. Valentine v. Wideopen W. Fin., LLC, 09 C 07653, 2012 WL 1021809, *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26,
2012) (citing Robbins, supra note 4, at 115-17).
143. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(10) (1977) (emphasis added).
26 [Vol. 40:1
Hiding in Plain Sight: "Conspicuous Type" Standards
is the notion of a "rational economic actor" who is presented with text and is "told"
that the text is important-usually implicitly, through the presentation of the
information in all-caps or bold-faced type. Under a rational economic actor theory,
the burden is then imposed on the reader to take all steps necessary to read and
decipher that conspicuous text.
As we know, of course, human beings do not always act in their best interests,
economic or otherwise.'" As Sunstein and Thaler have observed, our decisions are
often influenced in subtle ways by the context in which we encounter our
choices.145 When we cannot afford the time, energy, or cognitive load to make the
best decision, we devise shortcuts that may or may not be rational. 146  Herbert
Simon coined the term "satisficing" to describe this behavior, which he
characterized as "a more realistic decisionmaking strategy than rational utility
maximization: in response to inherent cognitive limitations, people satisfice by
searching for personally satisfactory solutions, rather than optimal ones, and they
stop when they find an acceptable choice." 47 Another scholar has described
"satisficing" as "economiz[ing] on information and search costs by choosing the
most satisfactory course of action readily available." 48 Professor Rakoff offers this
justification of satisficing behavior when facing form contracts:
Once form documents are seen in the context of shopping (rather than
bargaining) behavior, it is clear that the near-universal failure of
adherents to read and understand the documents they sign cannot be
dismissed as mere laziness. In the circumstances, the rational course is to
focus on the few terms that are generally well publicized and of
immediate concern, and to ignore the rest. The ideal adherent who would
read, understand, and compare several forms is unheard of in the legal
literature and, I warrant, in life as well. 149
It is common knowledge that many readers skip mandatory disclosures and other
clauses in contracts. Eric Zacks notes that "[b]ehavioral research shows.. . that
144. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionabil-
ity, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1218 (2003) ("Because buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully rational
decisionmakers, they will infrequently [incorporate all meaningful information into their decisions].").
145. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2008).
146. See Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the
Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 211 (2008) ("Most people rely on
cognitive shortcuts, or heuristics, to make decisions under time pressure or when confronted with information
that is cognitively challenging.").
147. Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1193, 1251 (1994) (citing JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41 (2d ed. 1993);
see also Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. Econ. REV. 1, I (1978).
148. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1025 (1991).
149. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173,
1226 (1983) (citing Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral
Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337,421 (2003)).
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contract warnings or disclosures are largely ignored by contracting parties." 50
Russell Korobkin "points out [that] the procedural inquiry asks whether the
allegedly unconscionable term was presented in such a way as to attract the reader's
attention-was it on the first page? was it in boldface? - but ignores the fact that
cognitively overburdened consumers might fail to process even a prominent
term."151
Some may wonder why legislatures should take the trouble to revise language
that people don't read. Revision of mandated communication language is worth the
effort for at least two reasons. First, the poor presentation of mandated language
may be part of the reason that consumers skip these clauses.152 Revising them will
help to assure that consumers, courts, and perhaps more importantly, consumer
advocates can understand precisely what these disclosures do and do not say. Any
subsequent changes to disclosure mandates can then be made more knowledgeably.
Second, mandatory disclosures are not the only mandated communication that
readers encounter. Court orders and other documents contain mandated
communication, and the readers of those documents may neglect important duties if
they skip this information due to poor writing or presentation.
To improve the readability of mandated communication, legislatures should
merge knowledge of behavioral biases with knowledge of reader behavior.
Although almost all human beings are readers (and vice versa), scholars who study
behavioral biases are just beginning to give weight to the physical and intellectual
realities of reading when they study how human beings interact with written
documents such as contracts. As White and Mansfield observed in 2002, "[t]he law
of contracts and consumer protection has yet to take account of the data now
available regarding adult literacy and the readability of contract forms." 53
More recently, another scholar analyzed potential pitfalls in a plain English
presentation of contract drafting. He observed that disclosures are "presented in an
explicit fashion, whether through the use of capital letters and boldfaced type or by
being set aside in separate paragraphs or pages."154 He goes on to note that
"[e]vidence suggests, however, that investors routinely ignore these warnings,"
despite their "explicit" presentation.155 Other scholars have recognized that the
method of presentation may not be sufficiently explicit for all readers. Reporting
results of a survey that sought to discern in part why people might choose not to
read contracts, Professors Stark and Choplin concluded that reading and
comprehension issues could be to blame, as influenced by the way the material was
presented:
150. Zacks, supra note 2, at 171-72.
151. James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 219 (2013) (citing Korobkin,
supra note 144at 1268-1272).
152. Admittedly, other issues are at play, including the length of the documents and the timing of the
disclosure. See generally Gibson, supra note 151.
153. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233,
234 (2002).
154. Zacks, supra note 2, at 202.
155. Id
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[o]ne reason why consumers might not read contracts is that the contract
forms are often user-unfriendly. Font sizes are often very small, and the
clauses within sentences can be very long, which can make it physically
difficult and taxing for consumers to read. These user-unfriendly features
increase fatigue, particularly among the elderly, stroke survivors, and
anyone who is even moderately visually impaired. In addition, the long
length of what the consumer is expected to read can cause consumers to
decide to at most skim, rather than carefully read, the documents they
sign.156
We know that human beings often "satisfice," or seek shortcuts, when they are
cognitively or visually challenged. As will be discussed below, the ineffective
presentation of written information can impose those challenges.
What should legislatures do with this information? When it comes to
disclosures that are drafted by sellers or mortgage lenders, legislatures could try to
identify ways to require or incentivize these actors to provide useful and meaningful
disclosures.15 7 But secondhand steps are not needed when it comes to the dozens of
statutes that mandate specific language and presentation methods in consumer and
government documents. These legislatures have decided to exercise almost total
control over this communication; they should exploit current knowledge about
effective communication to do all they reasonably can to make sure that their
readers understand the mandated communication.
Medical professionals have faced a similar problem in the creation of Patient
Education Materials.15 8 Patient Education Materials, not to be confused with
informed consent documents, 159 are meant to educate patients before or after
surgery or other medical interventions. 160  The medical and information design
156. Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths
Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 617, 656-57 (2009) (internal citations omit-
ted).
157. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 25, at 821 (discussing techniques to get lenders to improve their
forms).
158. E.g., Rennie L. Rhee, et. al., Readability and Suitability Assessment ofPatient Education Materials
in Rheumatic Diseases, 65 ARTHRITIS CARE & RES. 1702 (2013) ("More attention is being placed on health
care professionals and health systems to provide usable health information") (citing United States Dep't. of
Health and Human Servs., NATIONAL ACTION PLAN TO IMPROVE HEALTH LITERACY (2010)), available at
http://www.health.gov/comrnunication/hlactionplan/pdf/Health LiteracyActionPlan.pdf.These materials are
also known as "Printed Education Materials," or "Parent Education Materials," and are often known by the
acronym "PEM."
159. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Brenner, Alison Tytell Brenner & Daniel Horowitz, Beyond Informed Con-
sent: Education the Patient, CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS AND RELATED RES. (Feb. 2009), available at
http://www.ncbi.nln.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2628520/ (discussing informed consent as part of patient
education, but noting study of consent forms at five hospitals that found that the readability of the forms "was
approximately equivalent to that of the material intended for upper-division undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents. Four of the five forms were written at the level of a scientific journal, and the fifth at the level of a
specialized academic magazine.").
160. See generally Judy Singh, The Readability of Educational Materials Written for Parents of Chil-
dren with Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, 4 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 207, 208 (1995) ("Health and
mental health brochures are typically used to supplement instructions given by health care professionals and
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professionals who develop these materials devote much of their energy to
determining what makes people more likely to read and understand relevant
medical information. The documents that result, unlike those mandated by all-caps
and conspicuous type statutes, are meant to be inviting, easy-to-read documents that
impose few demands on the reader.' ' If this type of document is necessary for
patient education - if we cannot expect people to act as "rational economic readers"
when their physical health is at stake - it is even more unrealistic to expect them to
expend extra effort to be sure they comply with the law, or to protect their fiscal
health.
Understanding how readers behave, therefore, will help legislatures to draft
effective mandated communication statutes. Reader behavior has long been a focus
of legal writing scholarship and teaching; the "social perspective" school of writing
theory "offers techniques for analyzing a document's context and the bases for
individual writers' design decisions."l 62 Scholars know which writing and
typographic techniques speed and slow comprehension.163  If mandated
communication statutes are written to speed comprehension, they will by definition
reduce the time and cognitive costs that readers must invest and increase the chance
that readers will read and understand the information.
This article is far too short to provide a comprehensive discussion of current
knowledge about how people read. Scholars have studied reading for decades, and
the study of reading crosses several fields, including legal writing, which has
developed a sub-field in legal reading. 64
Psychologists, linguists, and information designers, among others, have studied
reading behaviors.165 Some scholars study the physical act of reading, noting how
readers' eyes move back and forth across the page or screen, 166 while others
analyze which sentence structures and organizational methods promote
provide directions for self-care or enable patients and their families to be better informed about their particular
condition.").
161. See, e.g., Stonecypher, supra note 87, at 463 ("Health care information must be presented in an
easy to read and user-friendly format so that all patients can comprehend it.").
162. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 16, at 708-713 (noting that the social perspective helps faculty
and students - and thus, lawyers - to ask the right questions, including "Who are the audiences for this docu-
ment? Who will use it? What are their needs and expectations?").
163. See generally, e.g., Kiernan-Johnson, supra note 15.
164. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to
Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 163 (1993) (this article is widely considered to be a foundational article in the
field of legal reading); see also James F. Stratman, When Law Students Read Cases: Exploring Relations
Between Professional Legal Reasoning Roles and Problem Detection, 34 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 57 (2002)
(discussing how reading with a purpose affects the act of reading); RUTH ANN MCKINNEY, READING LIKE A
LAWYER: TIME-SAVING STRATEGIES FOR READING LAW LIKE AN EXPERT (2d ed. 2012).
165. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HORN, INFORMATION DESIGN: EMERGENCE OF A NEW PROFESSION, IN IN-
FORMATION DESIGN 15, 22 (Robert Jacobson ed., 1999) (Noting that information design as a field "rests ...
on a variety of research foundations, including such disciplines and subject areas as human factors in technol-
ogy, educational psychology, computer interface design, performance technology, documentation design,
typography research, advertising, communication, and structured writing.").
166. See, e.g., GEOFFREY B. DUGGAN & STEPHEN J. PAYNE, SKIM READING BY SATISFICING: EVIDENCE
FROM EYE TRACKING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 1141-1150 (2011).
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comprehension. 167 Still others study whether the substantive context in which the
information appears (for example, in a "story" as opposed to "objectively") will
affect how the reader processes information and decides whether to believe it.168
There are many ways to manipulate the presentation of written information that
can change the way the writer perceives it (for example, framing, artful vocabulary
choices, level of detail, and so forth). 169 For the very basic communicative tasks
that are at the foundation of mandated communication statutes, however, the most
important techniques are those that speed comprehension.
To grossly summarize current reading theory: When we read, our eyes sweep
over a few words at a time in motions known as "saccades."l 70  Pauses for
comprehension are known as "fixations."' 7' During saccades, our peripheral vision
seeks to speed our reading by discerning letters we have read and that we will read,
and to help our brains to figure out words that these letters make up.172 If we have
trouble with comprehension during a fixation, we may re-read to increase
comprehension. 7 3 Of course, if we have too much trouble with comprehension, we
may stop reading. Implicit in the activity of reading is the decision to read any
piece of text and the necessity of finding each line of text and each word as we
proceed through a document. Implicit in the activity of comprehension is the ability
of the brain to store the information from the page.
To speed comprehension for readers of mandated communication-and thus to
avoid satisficing behaviors like skimming or ignoring information-legislatures
that are drafting or revising mandated communication statutes should focus on three
aspects of the writing: (1) the document design, that is, how the information is
presented on the page; (2) the word and sentence-level readability; and (3) the way
the information is organized, and the way in which it signals that organization to the
reader.
A. Document Design
Document design is simply the way that the information is arranged on the
page. Three significant aspects of document design are font, alignment, and white
167. See, e.g., Leonard G. Doak & Cecilia C. Doak, Writing for Readers with a Wide Range of Reading
Skills, 25 AM. MED. WRITERs' Ass'N J. 149 (2010).
168. See, e.g., RUTH ANNE ROBBINS ET. AL., YOUR CLIENT'S STORY: PERSUAsIVE LEGAL WRITING
(2012).
169. Judith D. Fischer, Got Issues? An Empirical Study about Framing Them, 6 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRIT-
ING DIRECTORS 1, 2-3 (2009) ("Framing theory, which has informed scholarship in several fields in recent
years, helps explain why an issue statement's wording is so important. Framing theory holds that people iden-
tify and label their experience through their mental frames.") (internal citations omitted).
170. Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson, supra note 15, at108.
171. Id.
172. Ralf Herrmann, How Do We Read Words and How Should We Set Them? WAYFINDING & TY-
POGRAPHY (June 14, 2011), available at http://opentype.info/blog/2011/06/14/how-do-we-read-words-and-
how-should-we-set-them/.
173. Kieman-Johnson, supra note 15, at 108 ("If, upon landing on a new place in the text, the brain is




space.174 Font size and presentation affect the reader's ability to discern letters and
words.175  Alignment affects the reader's ability to find information on the page,
and to move from one part of the text to another.176 White space affects overall
appearance of the page; if there is insufficient white space, the text may appear
dense and off-putting, leading the reader to skip the text.' 77
The use of all-caps versus mixed case is still an area of controversy in
typography. As noted above, many mandated communication statutes mandate all-
caps text. This mandate is surprising, because most people with even minimal
knowledge of document design agree that all-caps in any font is less effective, both
because most people read all-caps more slowly and because most people find it
visually unappealing.' 78 When the Navy recently gave up its more than century-
long use of all-caps in certain communications, an officer from another service
commented, "'[t]here is nothing worse than trying to read crap in all caps."' 80
Although most design experts agree that lower case letters are more legible, the
reasons behind the conclusion have varied over the years. Currently, two theories
hold sway. The first theory, often referred to as the "word shape theory" notes that
there is much more variety in the shape of lower case letters than in that of upper
case letters. 18 Upper-case letters, and words made up of upper-case letters, would
all fit into rectangular box, more or less.182 Lower case letters, in contrast, have
what are known as "ascenders" (parts of the letter that rise above the middle of the
text line) and "descenders" (parts of the letter that descend below the text line).
Thus, words made up of mixed-case type are not purely rectangular, and are thus
more individually distinguishable.
Eight lower-case letters have ascenders: b, d, f, h, i, k, 1, and t. Five lower-case
letters have descenders: g, j, p, q, y. Thirteen lower-case letters have neither
174. See generally, Robin Williams, THE NON-DESIGNERS' DESIGN BOOK (2d ed. 2004)
175. E.g., Dmitry A. Tarasov, Alexander P. Sergeeva, The Leading as a Factor of Readability: Devel-
opment ofthe Methodology for Educational Use, 106 PROCEDIA: SOC. AND BEHAV. SCI. 2914, 2915 (2013).
176. E.g., Williams, supra note 174, at 31-48.
177. E.g., Ros Dowse, Thato Ramela, & Sara H. Browne, An Illustrated Leaflet Containing Antiretro-
viral Information Targeted for Low-Literate Readers: Development and Evaluation, 85 PATIENT EDUC. AND
COUNSELING 508, 509 (2011) ("Problems [with a leaflet considered user-unfriendly] included incomprehensi-
ble technical language, use of medical jargon, small print size, insufficient white space, order of presentation
of the information and an overall information overload").
178. Miles A. Tinker, supra note 8, at 167 ("Most individuals prefer to read material printed in lower-
case. The subjective reaction of annoyance in reading text in capitals or italics may be significant for this
material is read appreciably slower than text printed in lower-case type.").
179. Julian E. Barnes, NOW HEAR THIS: NA VYABANDONS ALL CAPS, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2013),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324049504578541813637044462.html.
180. Id.
181. MARCIA LAUSEN, DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY: BALLOT AND ELECTION DESIGN 24-25 (2007) ("Un-
like the simple rectangles formed by groups of all capital letters, groups of lowercase letters form distinctive
silhouettes. . . . . [t]he decision to use all capital letters for candidate names is often made with the intent of
signifying importance. However, there are better ways to achieve this... [lI]arger and bolder type [can be]
used to place greater emphasis on candidate names [and]. ... [w]ords set with lowercase letters have a unique
shape, providing visual cues for identification.").
182. Id.
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ascenders nor descenders: a, c, e, m, n, o, r, s, u, v, w, x, z. Every capital letter, in
contrast, has ascenders that reach the top of the line; likewise, no capital letters have
descenders. Word shape theorists argue that mixed case words have shape
variations that are not available in all-caps words, and that readers use the word
shape (or "bouma")18 3 to help them identify known words.184
This theory has come under fire recently, due to evidence that word shapes per
se are meaningless.' 8 5 Kevin Larson, a psychologist at Microsoft, analyzed current
research extensively and concluded that "[w]ord shape is no longer a viable model
of word recognition. . .. [t]he bulk of scientific evidence says that we recognize a
word's component letters, then use that visual information to recognize a word." 86
Larson and others argue that mixed case text is preferable not because of the
bouma, or word shape, but because of the shapes of the letters. As we saccade
through the text, we use our direct vision to see only about five letters of text
clearly, through the fovea, or center of our retina.187 Our peripheral vision is taking
in other letters, but the images are blurred. It follows, then, that we prefer lower-
case text, because our blurred peripheral vision can more easily discern those letters
and use them to build words.' 88 For example, if you pick up a plastic bottle while
you are in the shower without your glasses on, you may have trouble differentiating
the uppercase word "SHAMPOO" from the word "CONDITIONER," but you
would have less trouble distinguishing the lower case "shampoo" from
"conditioner" because you would be more likely to recognize-even with limited
eyesight-the differing ascenders and descenders in the two familiar words.' 89 The
ability to use peripheral vision more effectively with mixed-case text may explain
why most of us just don't like all-caps writing. It slows us down because our
comprehension is restricted to the four or five letters visible to our fovea; our
peripheral vision sees just rectangular blurs.190 Accordingly, the "word shape
theory" might be renamed the "letter shape theory."
A second justification for the difference in reading speed between upper and
lower case letters is based on the use of eye-tracking technology to study the way
people read. Some scientists have concluded that readers read mixed case words
183. See generally James Robert Watson, Bouma: A Weird Word, But an Important Concept,
http://www.jamesrobertwatson.com/bouma.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) ("The term bouma appears in Paul
Saenger's 1997 book Space between Words: The Origins of Silent Reading. We recognize words from their
word shape and psychologists call this image the Bouma shape based on the Dutch psychologist Herman
Bouma who researched word-shape-based reading.)
184. See Robbins, supra note 4, at 117 ("Although in normal reading people do not read solely by shape
perception, we do tend to recognize more 'sight words' by shape than by individual letters.").
185. See Herrmann, supra note 172.
186. Kevin Larson, The Science of Word Recognition, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Bouma, MICROSOFT TYPOGRAPHY (July, 2004), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfonts/WordRecognition.aspx).
187. Herrmann, supra note 172.
188. See id.
189. I have conducted personal research on this issue.
190. For a convincing visualization of the readability of blurred mixed-case text versus blurred all-caps
text, see generally Herrmann, supra note 172.
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more quickly not because they are reading shapes, but because most prose is written
in mixed case, and so they are more familiar with it.191 This analysis would explain
why some old salts in the navy are dismayed at the Navy's recent departure from
all-caps: they are very familiar with the all-caps style, and so for them it is as easy
to read as mixed case. 192
All-caps is typically used to provide emphasis; in mandated communication
statutes, it is typically a method to draw the reader's eye. Other than all-caps, there
are three typographic methods of emphasis: Underlined text italicized text,
and bold-faced text. Scientists have tested each of these methods for reading speed
and reader preferences. Underlined text can slow reading speed, especially if more
than a couple of words are underlined, because the underline interferes with
descenders."' Similarly, italics can change the shape of a letter enough so that the
reader has to spend a bit more time discerning the words being read. Bold-faced
type slows reading the least and tends to be preferred as the method of emphasis by
most readers. 194
Larger fonts speed reading. 195 Although readers can read ten-point fonts and
even eight-point fonts (with reading glasses as appropriate), larger fonts speed
comprehension in a couple of ways. First, the words are bigger and just objectively
easier to read. Second, the text does not appear as dense when there are fewer
words per line and per page, thus making it more inviting to the reader. Those who
create Patient Education Materials recommend fonts of twelve points or larger.196
Alignment is the second crucial design element. Effective alignment enables
readers to find information on the page, and to move from one line of text to the
next without needless difficulty. When documents use alignment effectively,
readers know where to look. Once again, the differences can be subtle. With many
word-processing programs, full-justified text creates uneven spacing between
words; this uneven spacing in turn slows down the reader, who must make constant
minute re-adjustments in pacing to find the next word.197 Likewise, if a paragraph is
191. E.g., DENNIS R. PROFFITT & MELISSA M. WADE, CREATING EFFECTIVE VARIABLE MESSAGE
SIGNS: HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES 8 (1998), available at
http://www.virginiadot.org/vtrc/main/online reports/pdf/98-cr31 .pdf.
192. Barnes, supra note 179.
193. Robbins, supra note 4, at 118.
194. See Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 349, 374 (2008) (citing Karen A. Schriver, DYNAMICS IN DOCUMENT DESIGN: CREATING TEXT FOR
READERS 274 (1997)) ("Reading speed is optimal when uppercase and lowercase letters are used ... [w]hen
extra emphasis is needed, bold has been found to be a better cue than uppercase."). But see Jim Felici, THE
COMPLETE MANUAL OF TYPOGRAPHY, (2d ed. 2011) who finds bold to be "obtrusive" as compared with
italics, but does not address its legibility.
195. See Mary Jane Bernier, Developing and Evaluating Printed Education Materials: A Prescriptive
Model for Quality, 12 ORTHOPAEDIC NURSING 39, 44 (1993) ("Most readers prefer at least a 12 point print;
visually impaired readers and the elderly prefer larger print.").
196. E.g., id; Judith Hong et. al., Compassionate Care: Enhancing Physician-Patient Communication
and Education in Dermatology 68 JOUR. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF DERMATOLOGY, 364-65 (2013) ("Use larger
font, at least 12 points").
197. See SEC DISCLOSURE, supra note 4; see also M.A. Lewis & J.T. Newton, An Evaluation of the
Quality of Commercially Produced Patient Information Leaflets, 201 BRIT. DENTAL J., 114, 116-17 (2006).
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centered rather than left-justified, the reader must adjust to a new starting point for
each line of text.198
Finally, documents are harder to read if they don't have enough white space.
Readers perceive tightly-packed sentences as being difficult to read, and so they
may be more likely to ignore dense text.199 Likewise, eye-tracking studies show
that density of text (in addition to complexity of vocabulary) requires readers to
spend more time reading the text. Of course, readers who are not participating in an
eye-tracking study may be unwilling to spend the extra time, and may just refuse to
read or stop reading the document.
Many typographic factors can affect the amount of white space on a page. The
obvious methods are width of margins and line spacing (that is, single versus
double-spaced). More sophisticated methods include adjusting kerning, which
refers to the spaces between letters; and leading (rhymes with "sledding"), which
refers to the space between single-spaced lines of text. 200
B. Readability
Readability refers to the ability of the reader to understand the substance of the
words read. It is not to be confused with legibility, which refers to the ability to
discern letters and thus words. Several factors may affect readability, including
vocabulary, sentence length, and sentence structure.201 Related to all of these
factors is the cohesion of the text: reading comprehension is higher when the
writing makes its points explicitly and when readers can easily understand how the
different sentences relate to each other.202
As noted above, readers do not read word-by-word; rather, their eyes sweep a
few words at a time, interrupted by stops for comprehension. If text is difficult to
read or understand, reading is slowed because the reader's eyes must sweep over
the words again.203 A reader who is slowed too often may decide that time costs are
too great; a reader who must struggle to comprehend difficult prose may decide that
cognitive costs are too high. In either situation, the reader may give up and stop
reading.
Writers can speed comprehension (or avoid slowing it), by using simpler
vocabulary and by presenting familiar information to provide context for unfamiliar
(noting better legibility for documents that follow guidelines recommending left-justified text, and noting that
"text [should be] left-justified only as it is easier for the partially sighted to follow writing and in addition
keep[s] the space between words even, [which] helps reading.").
198. See SEC DISCLOSURE, supra note 4, at 45.
199. See SEC DISCLOSURE, supra note 4, at 46.
200. E.g., Robbins, supra note 4, at 123. "Leading" is a retronym; it originally referred to the thin piece
of lead that printers would place between lines of hand-composed text. Id.
201. E.g., Hong et al., supra note 196, at 365 ("readability is generally calculated on some combination
of sentence length, syllables, and/or word difficulty").
202. See generally WILLIAMS & COLOMB, supra note 9, at 66-81.
203. See Kiernan-Johnson, supra note 15, at 108. (If, upon landing on a new place in the text, the brain




information.204 Those developing patient education materials are advised to analyze
the educational level of the audience for the materials 205 and to use one or more
readability formulas to test the readability of the proposed materials. 206 One author
notes that writing to "sixth grade or lower" reading level is appropriate because
"[a]t least 75% of adult Americans will be able to read the materials written at this
level without difficulty." 207 Although we may presume that more sophisticated
readers will read some documents containing mandated communication-for
example, stock market prospectuses-many others may be directed at a widely
diverse audience. People of all educational levels may be subject to a child support
order, for example.
Syntactic structures also affect readability. We know, for example, that readers
understand concrete subject-verb combinations more easily than they understand
abstract nouns, or over-nominalized verbs. The theory behind this knowledge is
that people create mental pictures when they read. The more often sentences are
heavy on characters and actions in the subject and verb positions, the more easily
people will be able to picture, and thus understand, the information in those
sentences.208 Thus, people will understand "you can cancel this contract if you
wish," more quickly than they will understand "a right of cancellation is part of this
contract." Even though the word "cancellation" is an obvious nominalization of the
word "cancel," our brains process "cancel" more quickly than "cancellation."
Reading can also be slowed by other substantive issues. When text requires
readers to make an inference, their reading may be slowed as they take the time to
do so. 209 For example, if a child support order says "notice of change of address
must be provided," the reader must make an inference to determine whose address
must be provided and who must do the providing. Further, in some contexts, some
readers will not have the background experience or knowledge to make all of the
needed inferences. 210 Currently, many mandated communication statutes require
readers to make at least one crucial inference: that certain text is vitally important
because it is displayed in "bold and conspicuous," "all caps and conspicuous," or
"large and conspicuous" type. Legislatures could speed comprehension
significantly if they used a heading that explicitly stated, for example, "These
paragraphs are important: they explain that if you sign this document, you will
204. Benjamin, supra note 115, at 72.
205. Eg., Karin Gracey Menghini, , Designing and Evaluating Parent Educational Materials, AD-
VANCES IN NEONATAL CARE, Vol. 5, No. 5, 273, 275-76 (2005).
206. Id. at 278. Note that readability formulas are currently mandated in some legislation already, in
particular insurance contracts. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-38-30 (West, Westlaw through 2013 session)
("Any policy filed with the Commissioner must be accompanied by a certified Flesch scale readability analy-
sis and test score and by the insurer's certification that the policy is, in the insurer's judgment, readable based
on the factors specified in G.S. 58-38-20 and G.S. 58-38-25").
207. Menghini, supra note 206, at 278.
208. See, e.g., RICHARD WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 27-31 (5th ed. 2005).
209. Benjamin, supra note 115, at 70 (evaluating readability formulas and focusing on propositions and
inferences as a marker for text difficulty analysis).
210. Id. (when readers have to make more inferences, the text is more difficult because "a novice reader
may not have the schema in place to make the necessary inferences to comprehend the text").
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not have the right to a jury trial if you ever need to sue Acme, Inc. for any of
the reasons listed below."
Making text appropriately explicit is worth the trouble; if the text makes too
many demands on the reader, the reader may "satisfice" by abandoning the
document, and completely frustrate the communicative goal.
C. Organization and Organizational Signals
Comprehension can also be affected by poor organization and poor
organizational signals. As noted above, cognitive psychologists understand that
people comprehend new information better when they can mentally attach it to
"old" information. By using headings to signal organization, writers can "provide
the super-structure of the document, which leads to better concept recall." 211
Headings help in concept recall because they provide category names that aid in
"chunking," which is a technique that "seeks to accommodate short-term memory
limits by formatting information into a small number of units."2 12 Chunking is
particularly useful when readers need to recall or retain information, as might be the
case with certain government-related mandated communication.2 13 When readers
are given categories to attach the new information to, they are more likely to
remember that information; the categories give the readers a mental location in
which to store the information. The process of drafting the headings may also lead
to better organization, because it requires the writer to identify appropriate
categories, which will almost always lead to a more useful organizational structure.
Those who prepare educational materials find that using an FAQ format for
headings engages the reader more directly with the text and thus encourages
reading.2 14 In addition, writing the FAQ-style questions often forces writers into a
writing style that has more concrete subjects and verbs and that is, therefore, more
effective stylistically.
These methods, of course, are far from the only techniques writers can use to
speed reading and improve comprehension. In particular, there are more
sophisticated design techniques that writers can use (e.g., color, shorter lines,
columns, icons, pictures). However, the techniques discussed here are well-
accepted and easy to accomplish, even within the limits of widely available word
processing programs. These techniques can help legislatures to speed reader
comprehension of mandated communication in three ways: (1) They can make the
211. Robbins, supra note 4, at 125.
212. WILLIAM LIDWELL ET. AL., UNIFORM PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 30 (2003).
213. Id.; see also Leslie C. Hussey, Strategies for Effective Patient Education Material Design, 11 J.
CARDIOVASCULAR. NURSING. 37, 39 (1992). ("Organizing materials into categories and using category names
can increase recall and understanding.") Note that Sample B, at the beginning of this article, used chunking to
organize the information into three "chunks": (1) the information that needs to be provided, (2) the duration of
the obligation to provide the information, and (3) the penalties for failing to provide that information.
214. See Anca Micheti, Jacquelyn Burkell, & Valerie Steeves, Fixing Broken Doors: Strategies for
Drafting Privacy Policies Young People Can Understand, 30 BULL. OF Scl., TECH., & SoC'Y 130, 131 (2010).




mandated communication noticeable through the use of sufficient white space and
concrete, headings in bold-faced type. (2) They can ensure that the communication
is easily legible through the use of mixed-case font, large enough to be read by most
readers. (3) They can help to promote comprehension of the mandated
communication by writing explicitly, using concrete subject-verb structures, writing
at an appropriate reading level, and signaling organization with category-focused
headings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some courts seem to have the attitude that we should not have to encourage
readers to read important information, that these readers should recognize when
reading information is in their own interest, and that if they fail to read or to read
carefully, they are neglecting some sort of duty. Readers in certain contexts may
indeed have a duty to read carefully. But this article is addressing writing in
contexts where legislators have decided that it is very important to get specific
information to specific people at a specific time, and that it is so important that they
are going to mandate the words used and how they are presented. In that context, it
is not rational for legislators to write in a way that imposes a comprehension burden
on the reader; instead, they should do everything they can to ease both reading and
comprehension. If they don't have the expertise to write in a way that speeds
comprehension, they should hire people who do. 215
215. They may well be able to get such work at a reasonable cost by consulting legal writing faculty
who teach in law schools in or near state capitals.
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